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SOUTH AFRICA: USING THE LAW TO 
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A 
PIGMENTOCRACY 
Rex S. Heinke* 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER. By 
John Dugard. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
1978. Pp. xix, 470. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $12.50. 
John Dugard, Professor of Law at the University of the Wit-
watersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, has written an excellent 
critical analysis of the South African legal system. His discussion 
traces its development, beginning with the importation of 
Roman-Dutch law in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company, 
through the present day's uneasy synthesis of Roman-Dutch and 
English legal principles. Yet, this is not simply an historical over-
view; rather it is an examination of the development of Western 
legal theories and institutions in a non-Western setting. In partic-
ular, Professor Dugard discusses the conflict between parliamen-
tary sovereignty and a judiciary's power to declare laws unconsti-
tutional. 
Professor Dugard also examines in detail South Africa's ra-
cial laws, which make the immutable characteristic of race the 
primary determinant of legal,' social, and political status. South 
Africa prides itself on being an esteemed member of the com-
munity of Western nations and often refers to itself as the last 
bastion of Western civilization in Africa. In actuality, it is "a 
pigmentocracy in which all political power is vested in a white 
oligarchy, which in turn is controlled by an Afrikaner ~lite" (p.7). 
Professor Dugard also analyzes the repressive political laws which 
South Africa has devised to maintain this system. 
With regard to judicial review, Professor Dugard extensively 
discusses the battle to deprive colored (i.e., of mixed racial ances-
try) voters in the Cape Province of their right to elect members 
of their own race to Parliament. The South African Constitution 
was written primarily by the British after their victory in the 
Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. The Constitution provided voting 
rights for "coloreds" in the Cape Province (section 35) and equal 
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status for the English and Afrikaans languages (section 137). Sec-
tion 152 forbade the amendm~nt of sections 35, 137, and 152 
"unless the Bill be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting 
together, and at the reading be agreed to by not less than two-
thirds of the total members of both Houses of Parliament." Other 
than these clauses, commonly referred to as the "entrenched 
clauses," South Africa's Constitution contained no Bill of Rights. 
In 1948, having coined the word "ap!;lrtheid" as its slogan, 
the National Party ("Nats") came to power and has ruled South 
Africa ever since. In 1951, the Nats stripped colored voters of their 
right to elect members of their own race to Parliament by enact-
ing the Separate Representation of Voters Act. The Appellate 
Division, South Africa's highest court, promptly invalidated that 
act in the Vote case on the grounds that each House had passed 
the act separately rather than sitting together as the entrenched 
clauses required. 
The N ats quickly responded by passing the High Court of 
Parliament Act, which provided that if the Appellate Division 
invalidated an Act of Parliament, then Parliament, sitting as the 
High Court of Parliament, could review the Appellate Division's 
decision. The newly established High Court of Parliament imme-
diately reversed the Appellate Division's decision in the Vote 
case. The Appellate Division then invalidated the High Court of 
Parliament Act, on the ground that the entrenched cla~ses pro-
vided for judicial review by a real court, not by Parliament dis-
guised as a court. 
Lacking the votes in Parliament to eliminate the colored 
franchise by the necessary two-thirds majority of both Houses, 
the Nats decided to pack both the Appellate Division and the 
Senate (the upper house of Parliament). By a scheme reminiscent 
of President Roosevelt's plan to pack the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Appellate Division was increased from five to eleven members 
for any case where the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament 
was at issue. The size of the Senate was almost doubled and the 
methods for selecting the new Senators ensured the Nats a two-
thirds majority of both Houses sitting together. This done, section 
35 was removed from the Constitution, colored voters were only 
allowed to elect token whites to represent them in Parliament, 
and the courts were barred from ruling on the validity of any Act 
of Parliament other than one affecting the remaining two en-
trenched clauses. By a ten-to-one vote, the newly reconstituted 
Appellate Division sustained these laws. 
Professor Dugard's description of these events conveys their 
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drama and their importance for the future of South Africa. Un-
restrained by a Bill of Rights and a judiciary to enforce it, the 
N ats moved vigorously to implement apartheid. The domestic 
political opposition proved no match for the Nats. The black 
political opposition, primarily the African National Congress and 
the Pan-African Congress, was crushed with a series of politi-
cally repressive laws, discussed below. The white political oppo-
sition was either substantially in agreement with white control 
of South Africa, e.g., the United Party, or too weak to do more 
than delay for a short time the establishment of apartheid, e.g., 
the National Union of South African Students. 
Through a series of sweeping laws, the Nats legalized a four-
tier racial caste system. At the top are 4,300,000 whites, followed 
by 2,400,000 coloreds, then 746,000 Asians, and finally 18,600,000 
Africans. What distinguishes apartheid from other forms of rac-
ism is its explicit endorsement of skin color as the basis for the 
application of laws. 
There are myriad racial laws which make up this system: the 
Group Areas Act, which is the legal authority for the forced re-
moval of blacks from their homes in order to increase segregation; 
the ironically entitled Extension of University Education Act, 
which segregated the previously "open" universities of the Wit-
watersrand and Cape Town; and the infamous pass law system, 
that requires all Africans to carry passports in their own country. 
These are only a few of the many apartheid laws Professor Dugard 
examines. 
The centerpiece of apartheid is the "homeland" policy, 
which is also analyzed by Professor Dugard. Pursuant to this 
policy, South Africa is being balkanized into a number of 
"homelands" for black tribal groups, including the Northern 
Sotho, Southern Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tsevana, Venda, Xhosa, 
and Zulu. In theory, these homelands are to become independent 
nations; two have already been granted nominal "independence," 
although all nations but South Africa have ignored them diplo-
matically. In practice, important matters, such as defense, for-
eign affairs, and, to a considerable extent, internal security, will 
not be under the control of the homelands, and all important 
decisions must be approved by the white government in South 
Africa. Apartheid's theory is that all members of each tribe, 
whether or not born in their homeland, are citizens of a prescribed 
homeland and not citizens of the Republic of South Africa, even 
if they were born and have always lived in the Republic. The most 
developed of the homelands, the Transkei, has 1.5 million such 
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citizens, and there are another 7.5 million similarly situated Afri-
cans whose homelands are being or have yet to be created. In 
addition, there are almost two and one-half million colored people 
and three quarters of a million Asians who have no homeland and 
have no prospect of meaningful political rights in white South 
Africa. 
A central failure of the homelands policy is its inability to 
acknowledge that South Africa depends absolutely upon black 
labor whose claim to fair treatment cannot be avoided by creating 
fictional countries. Moreover, the allotment of only thirteen per-
cent of South Africa's land for the "homelands" of approximately 
seventy percent of its population emphasizes that the 
"homelands" are- no solution to black demands for political 
power. 
To maintain its pigmentocracy, South Africa has erected an 
enormous set of legal restrictions that severely limit civil rights. 
Possibly the most widely used method of silencing opposition to 
apartheid is the "banning order." By issuing a banning order, the 
Minister of Justice may without a hearing impose a combinatfon 
of the following restrictions: that the banned person may not 
leave a certain area, e.g., a suburb or even his home; that he must 
periodically, often daily, report to a police station; that he can 
only visit with a specified number of persons at a time, sometimes 
only one family member at a time; and that he may not enter 
certain areas, e.g., a union organizer is often banned from all 
factories, or a student from all universities, thus preventing him 
from carrying on his normal occupation. Moreover, the writings 
or statements of such persons may not be quoted or published 
anywhere in South Africa. Banning orders are usually imposed for 
five years and are often successively reimposed. Since no banning 
order has ever been overturned by the South African courts, 
there is, as a practical matter, no relief from such orders. 
The Terrorism Act is probably the clearest example of how 
far South Africa has veered from the basic precepts of Western 
legal systems. It reverses the normal presumption of innocence in 
criminal cases so that those charged with its violation, which is a 
capital offense, are presumed guilty unless they can prove their 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The Act's terms are so 
vague that it is difficult to know when they are being violated. 
For example, the Terrorism Act makes it an offense to commit 
any act "with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and 
order." The requisite intent is presumed if the act is deemed 
likely to "embarrass the State in the administration of its af-
388 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:384 
fairs." Such uncertainty is a hallmark of South African law and 
discourages most people from engaging in any activity that might 
even arguably be illegal. 
The Terrorism Act also provides for indefinite periods of de-
tention for people charged with its violation. Only government 
officials are entitled to information "relating to or obtained from 
any detainee." On this legal authority, the police refuse to iden-
tify those detained, and the Minister of Justice has even refused 
to tell members of Parliament who is being held. Thus, when 
people disappear without trace, it is often assumed that they have 
been arrested by the Bureau of State Security (B.O.S.S.) or some 
other police agency. This secret detention process frequently 
leads to the torturing and even the death of detainees. The recent 
torture and death of Steve Biko, while under such detention, is 
one of the few such incidents that has been widely publicized in 
the United States. 
Professor Dugard traces the history and effects of these and 
many other South African political laws. He also analyzes such 
laws in terms of the philosophical conflict between natural law 
and legal positivism. Those who wish to understand South Africa 
and its legal system will benefit greatly by reading Professor Du-
gard's book which discusses these and numerous other issues. 
This book, then, inevitably raises the question of South Af-
rica's future. With Namibia and Rhodesia slowly but inexorably 
slipping out of its orbit, South Africa will soon confront black-
ruled countries on all of its borders. This situation will surely lead 
to increasingly violent attempts to alter the South African status 
quo. 
Afrikaaners consider themselves as much a part of Africa as 
Americans consider themselves a part of the United States of 
America. They would no more leave Africa than Americans would 
leave the United States. Thus, even if many of the English-
speaking white South Africans leave South Africa when it has to 
fight guerillas, a bloody race war seems inevitable. One must 
hope that the people of South Africa will awaken to their mutual 
dependence before relations are so poisoned that no compromise 
can be reached. But one must wonder whether that point has not 
already been reached. 
